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Since the revision of the Japanese immigration law in 1990, there has been a dramatic 
influx of Latin Americans, mostly Brazilians, of Japanese origin (Nikkeijin) working in 
Japan. This is mainly because the revision has basically allowed Nikkeijin to enter Japan 
legally even as unskilled workers, while the Japanese law, in principle, prohibits 
foreigners from taking unskilled jobs in the country. In response, the number of these 
Latin American migrants has increased from practically zero to more than 250,000. The 
migration of Nikkeijin is likely to have a significant impact on both the Brazilian and the 
Japanese economies, given the substantial amount of remittances they send to Brazil. 
The impact is likely to be felt especially in the Nikkeijin community in Brazil.   
 
In spite of their importance, the detailed characteristics of Nikkei migrants and the 
prospect for future migration and remittances are under-researched. The major purpose 
of this paper is therefore to provide a more comprehensive account of the migration of 
Nikkeijin workers to Japan. The paper contains a brief review of the history of Japanese 
emigration to Latin America (mostly Brazil), a study of the characteristics of Nikkeijin 
workers in Japan and their current living conditions, and a discussion on trends and 
issues regarding immigration in Japan and migration policy. The final part of the paper 
briefly notes the limitation of existing studies and describes the Brazil Nikkei Household 
Survey, which is being conducted by the World Bank Research Group at the time of 
writing this paper. The availability of the survey data will certainly contribute to a better 
understanding of the Japan-Brazil migration and remittance corridor.    3
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Since the revision of the Japanese immigration law in 1990, there has been a dramatic 
influx of Latin Americans, mostly Brazilians, of Japanese origin (Nikkeijin) working in 
Japan. This is mainly because the revision has basically allowed Nikkeijin to enter Japan 
legally even as unskilled workers, while the Japanese law, in principle, prohibits 
foreigners from taking unskilled jobs in the country. In response, the number of these 
Latin American migrants has increased from practically zero to more than a quarter of 
million. According to the statistics provided by the Japanese Ministry of Justice, the 
number of Brazilians staying in Japan increased from about 4,000 in 1988 to 268,332 in 
2002. In 2005 the number further increased to 302,080. The migration of Nikkeijin is 
likely to have a significant impact on both the Brazilian and Japanese economies, given 
the substantial amount of remittances they send to Brazil. The impact is likely to be felt 
especially in the Nikkeijin community in Brazil. While the number of Nikkeijin in Brazil 
is estimated to be a little less than two million, about a quarter of million Nikkeijin 
migrant workers from Brazil are currently in Japan. In other words, about one in every 
eight  Nikkeijins in Brazil is living in Japan. Given the high rate of return/circular 
migration, practically every Nikkeijin household has one member of the household with 
some working experience in Japan. 
 
In spite of their importance, the detailed characteristics of Nikkei migrants and the 
prospect for future migration and remittances are under-researched. The major purpose 
of the present paper is therefore to examine the migration and remittance issues as well 
as their policy implications pertaining to Nikkeijin working in Japan. Although the main 
focus of the paper is placed on Nikkeijin workers, some discussions of migrant workers 
in general and the government policies towards foreign workers are also included since 
these issues are not widely known to non-Japanese. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the history of Japanese 
emigration to Latin America (mostly Brazil). This section is indispensable for 
understanding the characteristics of return migration of Nikkeijin to Japan. Section III 
discusses general trends and issues regarding immigration in Japan. Section IV, the core 
section of this paper, describes the major characteristics of Nikkeijin workers in Japan 
including the place of their residence, the types of their work, the duration of their stay, 
and the difficulties these Nikkeijin migrants face. The section also draws attention to the 
present situation and future prospect of remittances to their home countries. In addition, 
the section reviews policies of the central and local governments towards Nikkeijin 
workers. Given that the number of Nikkeijin workers has dramatically increased and 
they tend to be clustered in several cities (e.g. Hamamatsu, Toyota, Toyohashi, and 
Oizumi), the social and economic impacts of Nikkeijin workers on these cities are likely 
to be substantial. In response, governments as well as NGOs are making various efforts 
to create harmonious living of Nikkeijin workers within Japanese communities. Finally, 
Section V briefly notes the limitation of existing studies and describes the Brazil Nikkei 
Household Survey, which is being conducted by the World Bank Research Group at the 
time of writing this paper. The availability of the survey data will certainly contribute to  5
a better understanding of the Japan-Brazil migration and remittance corridor. Section VI 
summarizes the findings of the study, and discusses agendas for future studies. 
 




Before discussing Nikkeijin workers in Japan, let us examine the history of Japanese 
emigration to Latin America. In view of the fact that 85 percent of Nikkeijin workers 
from Latin America to Japan are Brazilians (see Section IV for more details), this 
section focuses primarily on Japanese emigration to Brazil. As the chronology of the 
Japanese emigration in the Appendix I shows, this migration began in 1908, when the 
ship named Kasado-Maru, carrying 791 Japanese bonded workers (colonos), arrived in 
the port of Santos. They were initially employed as bonded workers in coffee 
plantations. They gradually began to be engaged in various activities in Brazil including 
cultivation of various crops (other than coffee), commerce, and education. The current 
number of Nikkeijin in Brazil is estimated to be close to two million as indicated in 
Table 1. 
 
The 100 years of Japanese emigration to Brazil may be divided into five periods as 
follows: 
 
Period 1 (1908-1924): Immigration by private initiatives 
Period 2 (1925-1936): Government sponsored immigration 
Period 3 (1937-1951): Immigration stricken by the War and its aftermath 
Period 4 (1952-1987): Post-war immigration 
Period 5 (1988- to present): Return migration to Japan (Dekasegi) 
 
This section will briefly discuss Periods 1 to 4, and the detailed discussion of Period 5 
will be made in Section IV below. 
 
(2) Prologue (before 1908) 
 
The government of Japan in Tokugawa era (i.e., Samurai era) had closed the country in 
1639 fearing the spread of Christianity. Since then Japan had very limited contact with 
the outside world for more than 200 years until American Commodore Perry came to 
Uraga City and forced Japan to open the country in 1853. Japanese emigration began in 
1868 (the first year of Meiji era), when about 500 Japanese immigrants arrived in 
Hawaii (and 40 in Guam). In 1869 about 40 Japanese immigrants arrived in California. 
Because of the maltreatment of the Japanese migrants in the destination countries, the 
Japanese government became reluctant to encourage emigration. However, in the 1880s 
the attitude of the Government changed due to the country’s stagnant economy. In order 
to mitigate unemployment problems, the Japanese government finalized official 
migration agreement with the Government of Hawaii in 1885. In that year, the first 
official Japanese immigrants – 943 of them – arrived in Hawaii. Between 1885 and  6
1894, many “official” Japanese immigrants were sent to different destinations including 
Hawaii, the mainland of the United States, Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji. 
 
In 1894, “Migration Protection Regulation (Imin Hogo Kisoku)” was issued by the 
Japanese government, which assigned private migration companies to recruit and 
arrange Japanese emigration. Since then several migration companies took an initiative 
to send Japanese immigrants to all over the world. While major destinations of these 
immigrants were Hawaii and the United States, they were also sent to other parts of the 
world. For example, 790 Japanese bonded workers arrived in Peru in 1899, and about 
3,000 Japanese bonded workers were sent to the Philippines in 1903. The United States 
and Canada, however, began to restrict Japanese immigration. In 1907 the Japan-U.S. 
Gentlemen’s Agreement was signed, which severely restricted Japanese immigration to 
the United States including Hawaii that was annexed to the United States in 1898. In 
1908 a similar gentlemen’s agreement was concluded between Japan and Canada. As a 
result, the immigration to North America became extremely restricted, and the 
migration companies had to look for new destinations, mainly in Latin America. Table 2 
shows the number of Japanese immigrants to Latin America between 1899 and 1941 
(the year when Japan-U.S. Pacific War broke out). More than a quarter of million 
Japanese migrated to Latin America and Brazil was by far the main destination with 
more than 200,000 (78.43%) Japanese immigrants (De Carvalho, 2003). Peru followed 
Brazil and received about 33,000 Japanese migrants. Brazil was also the single most 
important destination after World War II. More than 60 percent of Japanese emigrants to 
Latin America headed for Brazil. 
 
The desire of Japanese migration companies to shift Japanese emigration from North 
America to South America coincided with an increase in the demand for labor in Brazil. 
The major sources of labor for coffee plantations in Brazil used to be slaves brought 
from Africa. However, the slavery was abolished in Brazil in 1888. Due to the labor 
shortage caused by the emancipation, the owners of coffee plantations began to accept 
immigrants from Europe, mainly from Italy and Spain at first. Nevertheless, the 
shortage of labor was not overcome by the European immigration alone. Therefore, the 
owners of coffee plantations started to explore other sources of labor supply. This 
development coincided with the need of Japanese migration companies to look for 
destinations other than North America for Japanese migrants. Consequently, the 
agreement between a Japanese migration company and the government of São Paulo 
was signed in 1907. 
 
(3) Period 1 (1908-1924): Immigration by Private Initiatives 
 
On April 28, 1908, the Kasado-Maru left the port of Kobe for Brazil. The ship carried 
781 Japanese emigrants who all expected to become wealthy in a few years in Brazil 
and to return to Japan in triumph. In order to enhance the recruitment of Japanese 
emigrants to Brazil, Kokoku Shokumin Kaisha (Imperial Migration Company), a 
private migration company, issued a deceiving advertisement. According to the 
advertisement, coffee was “a tree of gold”, and each family of Japanese migrants in  7
Brazil could save 40 yen a month (at that time a monthly salary of a young teacher in 
the elementary school was 10-13 yen). This advertisement was sanctioned by the 
Japanese Police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
While the Japanese migrants dreamed of the tree of gold, the owners of coffee 
plantations simply wanted cheap labor. The Japanese migrants thus faced 
disappointment: their actual income was far less than advertised (just a subsistence 
level) and their working conditions were harsh. Although the Japanese immigrants 
dreamed of returning home after making a fortune in a few years, it remained just a 
dream. Of the 200,000 Japanese migrants who had migrated to Brazil before World War 
II, only seven percent actually returned to Japan (Takahashi, 1993). The majority of 
them thus remained in Brazil without knowing when (or if) they would make enough 
money to return home. 
 
Despite the hardship of the Japanese immigrants in Brazil, the migration wave to Brazil 
continued, partly because the Government of São Paulo and the owners of coffee 
plantation gave travel subsidies to Japanese migrants. Table 3 shows the number of 
Japanese emigrants to Brazil since 1908. As the table indicates, the number of Japanese 
immigrants to Brazil surged in the 1910s. In most years, the number reached several 
thousands per year. In 1914 the total (accumulated) number of Japanese immigrants to 
Brazil exceeded ten thousands. 
 
Almost all of the Japanese immigrants to Brazil in early years were bonded workers 
called “colonos.” These colonos were obliged to stay at their original plantations for a 
few years under the contract. Nevertheless, due to the low wages and harsh working 
conditions, most of them left the plantation before their contracted term was over. Some 
of them just ran away under the cloak of night, while others made an agreement with the 
plantation owners to move away to other plantations. After leaving their original 
plantations, these migrants had to find other jobs for living, which can be classified into 
three broad categories: (i) working in coffee and cotton plantations owned by relatively 
well-off Japanese; (ii) engaging in rice cultivation in the Rio Grande delta area; and (iii) 
moving to cities like São Paulo and working as domestic help etc. As early as 1909 (just 
one year after Kasado-Maru arrived in São Paulo) five Japanese families owned land in 
Brazil and had started the cultivation of cotton. In 1915 several Japanese plantations 
called “colonies” were opened, the most famous of which was Hirano Colony Plantation. 
Table 4 shows the crop share of Nikkeijin farmers in Brazil since 1912. As this table 
reveals, in 1912 more than 90 percent of Japanese farmers were engaged in coffee 
production. However, 10 years later (in 1922), the share of farmers engaged in coffee 
production dropped to half, whereas the shares of rice, cotton, and suburb farming (e.g. 
vegetables, eggs, and chicken) increased substantially. 
 
The Japanese migrants realized that it was extremely difficult for them to become rich 
and to return home quickly. Hence they began to form infrastructure in the Nikkeijin 
communities. As they never gave up the idea of returning home some day, they put a 
particular emphasis on the Japanese language education for their children. In 1915 the  8
first Japanese language school opened in São Paulo (Taisho School). Since then the 
number of Japanese language schools increased rapidly. In 1932 the number of Japanese 
schools in São Paulo alone was close to 200, with more than 10,000 Nikkeijin children 
being enrolled. In 1916 the first Japanese-language newspaper was published. In those 
years, Nikkeijin lived within Nikkeijin communities without assimilating into Brazilian 
communities. In many cases they did not speak Portuguese, and inter-marriages were 
rare.   
 
(4) Period 2 (1925-1936): Government-sponsored Immigration 
 
As mentioned above, in early years the São Paulo Government and the owners of 
plantations gave Japanese immigrants travel subsidies hoping that those Japanese 
immigrants would provide cheap labor for coffee plantations. However, since the 
Japanese immigrants did not stay in the original coffee plantations, the government of 
São Paulo announced the termination of travel subsidies to Japanese immigrants in 1921. 
In response, the Japanese government decided in 1925 to provide travel subsidies to 
Japanese emigrants who wanted to go to Brazil. This was the beginning of the era of 
government-sponsored migration to Latin America. In addition to travel subsidies, in 
1926 the Japanese government loaned a large amount of money (80,000 yen), with very 
low interest rates, to Japanese coffee farmers in Brazil, who were suffering from the 
plunge of world coffee price. In 1927, “Overseas Immigration Union Law (Kaigai Iju 
Kumiai Ho)” was enacted in Japan. The purpose of the law was to promote Japanese 
colony plantations all over the world, except in the United States and Canada. The 
United States and Canada adopted very strict policies against Japanese immigration. For 
example, in 1924, the United States enacted the law, which completely prohibited new 
immigration from Japan. In 1928, Canada took a similar measure to severely restrict 
Japanese immigration to the country. In 1928, the Ministry of Immigration (Takumu 
Sho) was created in the Japanese government with the mission to promote and direct 
Japanese emigration overseas (except for the United States and Canada destinations). 
 
Due to the emigration promotion policies by the Japanese government and the shift 
from the United States and Canada, the flow of Japanese immigration to Brazil greatly 
increased in those years. As Table 3 shows, the number of Japanese annual emigration 
to Brazil more than doubled in 1925. The high rate of immigration continued until the 
mid-1930s. During the period, the average number of Japanese emigration to Brazil 
exceeded 10,000 per year. 
 
In the 1930s, the Japanese imperialism, backed by the military force, became prevalent, 
and the Japanese invasion to China was intensified. In 1931 the Manchurian Incident, 
i.e., the war between Japan and China, broke out. In 1932 Manchuria became an 
“independent state”, which was a puppet regime of the Japanese military force. Since 
then the flood of Japanese immigration to Manchuria continued until the end of World 
War II (in 1945). In the same year, the Japanese government greatly increased travel 
subsidies given to the Japanese migrants traveling to Brazil in order to boost the 
immigration to Brazil. As a result, more than 20,000 Japanese arrived in Brazil in 1933  9
(and also in 1934). 
  
The military advance of Japan put Nikkeijin in Brazil into a difficult situation. Since 
Brazil was a close ally of the United States, the country discouraged the inflow of 
immigrants from Japan, Germany, and Italy. In 1934 the famous “two percent clause” 
was added to the Brazilian Constitution, which limited the number of annual inflow of 
immigrants from each country to two percent of the total immigration from that country 
in the previous 50 years. Since Japanese immigration had a short history (started in 
1908), the two percent clause meant a drastic decline of Japanese immigration to Brazil.   
 
In 1936 the Japanese militarism further intensified due to the “2.26 incident.” On 
February 26, about 1,400 military personnel attempted a coup d’etat in Japan. Many 
politicians, including the Minister of Finance, were assassinated. Although the coup 
attempt failed, the military authorities practically took over the Japanese government 
since then.   
 
(5) Period 3 (1937-1951): Immigration Stricken by the War and Its Aftermath 
 
Faced with the military advance of Japan and the imminent breakout of the warfare 
between Japan and the United States, Brazil, a close ally of the United States, began to 
take oppressive measures against Nikkeijin in Brazil. The Brazilian government tried to 
force Nikkeijin to assimilate to Brazilian society and to become Brazilian rather than 
Japanese. In an attempt to force assimilation, the Brazilian government prohibited 
Japanese language education for students under the age of fourteen in 1937. In 1938 the 
Brazilian new immigration law was enacted, which severely restricted Nikkeijin’s rights. 
In that year, Japanese (also German and Italian) language schools were forced to be 
completely closed in Brazil. In 1939 World War II broke out, and many Japanese 
immigrants returned to Japan to fight for their country. In 1941 the Japanese language 
and Japanese newspapers were prohibited in Brazil. The Pacific War (Japan-U.S. War) 
also broke out in the same year, turning Nikkeijin into people from an enemy country. In 
1942 Brazil cut any diplomatic relation with Japan, Germany, and Italy, and further 
oppressive measures were imposed on Nikkeijin in Brazil. As a result, the number of 
Japanese immigration to Brazil decreased to zero in that year. Some of the Nikkeijin 
properties were frozen, and Nikkeijin were expelled from certain districts of large cities 
for “national security” reasons.   
 
In June 1945, Brazil declared a war against Japan. On August 6 and 9, the U.S. dropped 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered to 
the Allied Nations. In spite of the defeat of Japan in 1945, most Nikkeijin did not believe 
it, because they did not have any access to information from Japan and they had been 
told, by pre-war education, that Japan was the nation of the Sacred God, which would 
never lose. Nikkeijin who did not believe in the Japanese defeat were called “Kachi 
Gumi (the group of winners)”, whereas those who did were called “Make Gumi (the 
group of losers). In the following few years after the end of the war, extremist groups of 
Kachi Gumi carried out terrorist attacks against Make Gum people. Many assassinations  10
of leaders of Make Gumi were made by radical Kachi Gumi members. This conflict 
between Kachi Gumi and Make Gumi was a tragic event in the history of Nikkeijin in 
Brazil.  
 
Another tragic incident was the “return home scam.” Since many Nikkeijin in Brazil 
believed that Japan won the war, they were waiting for the triumphant Japanese ships to 
arrive in Brazil to save them from their hardship in Brazil. Some scam artists, who were 
also Nikkeijin, took the advantage of this situation and provided other Nikkeijin false 
information that a Japanese ship would arrive in, say, the port of Santos the following 
month. In order to reserve the seat on the ship, people were asked to make an advance 
payment for the return ticket. Despite such a simple hoax, many Nikkeijin actually 
became the victims of this scam. In 1950, about 50 members of the right-wing fraud 
syndicate “Kokumin Zenen Tai (National Vangurd)” were arrested in São Paulo for the 
return home scam. 
 
In spite of the hardship, Japanese immigrants worked hard, and put an emphasis on 
education of their descendents. As time went by, successful Nikkeijin emerged in Brazil. 
For example, in 1951 Mr. Tamaru became the first Nikkeijin parliament member of the 
State of São Paulo. 
 
(6) Period 4 (1952-1987): Post-war Immigration 
 
In 1952 the Brazilian government approved a resumption of Japanese immigration to 
Brazil, and the first Japanese immigration ship after World War II arrived in Santos in 
1953. After the end of World War II, the Japanese government promoted emigration to 
mitigate poverty and unemployment in Japan. During World War II, most major cities in 
Japan, including Tokyo, Osaka, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Kobe to name a few, were 
almost completely destroyed by carpet bombing of the U.S. forces. About eighty percent 
of the production capacity of the Japanese economy was lost. The situation facing Japan 
at the time was probably worse than that of many developing countries today. In an 
attempt to ease unemployment, in 1955 the Emigration Bureau (Iju Kyoku) was created 
in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The mission of the department was to 
promote Japanese emigration overseas, mainly to the Americas, e.g. the United States, 
Brazil, Argentina, and Dominican Republic. As Table 3 shows, the average number of 
Japanese emigration to Brazil in 1955-1961 was more than 5,000 per year. 
  
However, the wave of the post-war immigration was short-lived because of the 
economic success of Japan following the war. Although the Japanese economy was 
severely damaged by the war, Japan showed a swift recovery and a miraculous 
economic development thanks to effective industrial and trade policies (see Figure 1 for 
real GDP of Japan). In 1961 the Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda announced the “income 
doubling plan”, which initiated miraculous economic growth in Japan. As a result of the 
effective economic policy, the Japanese economy began to show a sign of strong 
recovery, and the double-digit growth rate continued until the Nixon Shock in 1971. 
Table 5 reports GDP and per capita GDP of selected OECD countries since 1950. In  11
1950 the GDP per capita of Japan was less than seven percent of that of the United 
States. The speed of the country’s catch-up was remarkable, and the Japanese per capita 
income has exceeded that of the Unites States since 1990.
1 
 
Thanks to the prosperity in Japan after the mid-1960s, the movement of people from 
Japan to Brazil decreased, and foreign direct investment to Brazil rose instead. In the 
late 1970s, more than 500 Japanese firms went to Brazil. Although the Japanese 
immigrants before and during the war were Japanese who wanted to return to Japan 
sooner or later, the Japanese migrants in the post-war period, especially the descendents 
of the earlier migrants, were Nikkeijin who expected to live permanently in Brazil. 
Because of the emphasis on education, Nikkeijin are still playing important roles in 
Brazil today, e.g. many of them have become politicians, doctors, lawyers, and 
professors. 
 
Since the late 1980s, a great number of Nikkeijin in Brazil have been returning to Japan 
to make money, which is the migration in the opposite direction to Japanese emigration 
in the past. The detailed discussion of the return migration of Nikkeijin is given in 
Section IV below. 
 
III. Government Policy toward Migrant Workers in Japan 
 
1. Recent Trend in Number of Migrant Workers in Japan 
 
While the previous section has examined emigration from Japan, this section will 
discuss immigration into Japan. Although Japan has a restrictive policy toward foreign 
workers, their number has been increasing rapidly. Table 6 lists the share of foreign 
population in the total population in selected countries in 1990. As indicated in the table, 
only 1.2 percent of the total population was foreign born in East/Southeast Asia, which 
is substantially less than the share in North America (8.6%) or Europe (5.0%). The 
foreign born population had a relatively larger share in some internationalized countries 
(areas) such as Hong Kong (40.0%) and Singapore (15.5%). In total the share of 
foreigners in Japan was only 0.9 percent, which was among the lowest in the world.   
 
Nevertheless, the share has been increasing rapidly since the 1990s. Table 7 shows the 
changes in the aggregate number of registered foreigners in Japan since 1978. The 
number of registered foreigners almost doubled from 1.1 million in 1990 to 2 million in 
2005. The share of foreign population in 2004 was 1.6 percent. Even if the share is still 
smaller than that of most countries in the world, the rate of increase has been dramatic. 
Table 8 presents the number of registered foreigners by regions. Three quarters are from 
Asian countries, while the share of people from South America was 18.2 percent in 
2004, most of them being Nikkeijin from Brazil, as will be discussed further in the next 
                                                  
1  Needless to say, it is difficult to compare the GDP of one country with that of another country, because 
the international comparison depends on the foreign exchange rates between their currencies. 
    12
section. 
 
2. Basic Principles of the Japanese Immigration Policy 
 
Let us examine the basic principles of the Japanese immigration policy. The policy of 
the Japanese government toward migrant workers is very clear. The Ninth Basic Plan of 
Employment Measures, approved by the Cabinet in August 1999, presents three 
principles for the Japanese immigration policy as follows (translation by the author): 
 
(i)  As for foreign workers with professional skills, their immigration to Japan 
should be promoted in order to vitalize economy and society of Japan, and to 
promote further internationalization of Japan; 
(ii)  As for the so-called unskilled foreign workers, their immigration should be 
carefully monitored given that their admission is likely to have a serious impact 
on the economy and society of Japan and the lives of Japanese citizens; 
(iii)  It is improper to consider immigration as a way to cope with the expected labor 
shortage due to the aging population and declined fertility in Japan. In order to 
deal with the labor shortage, it is important to create a society where elderly and 
women can actively participate in the labor market.   
 
From the above, it is clear that the Japanese government welcomes professional and 
skilled foreign workers, but prohibits admission of unskilled foreign workers with some 
exceptions, e.g., Nikkeijin as discussed below. However, it has been argued in recent 
years that Japan should accept more foreign workers, both skilled and unskilled. Since 
the Japanese population is rapidly aging, the country will not be able to cope with 
possible labor shortage without accepting immigration at a large scale. Furthermore, it is 
argued that migration to Japan benefits sending countries by increasing their GDP 
through remittances sent back by migrants. For this reason Japan, one of the richest 
countries in the world, has a responsibility to admit migrant workers from poor 
developing countries.     
 
3. Three Categories of Migrant Workers in Japan 
 
(1)  Legal Skilled Workers 
Table 9 summarizes the number of migrant workers in Japan by visa categories in 2002.   
As shown in the table, the number of legal and skilled workers is very small, only about 
0.3 percent (179,643) of the total Japanese labor force. Even when unskilled workers, 
mostly from Latin America, are included, the number of legal migrant workers makes 
up 0.62 percent (413,536) of the labor force. This is partly due to the strict Japanese 
immigration law, which severely restricts the number of jobs that foreign workers are 
allowed to take in the country. Therefore, most legal foreign workers, except for Latin 
Americans of Japanese origin, Nikkeijin, are professional workers, such as professors, 
researchers, lawyers, and accountants. In comparison with the European countries, the 
share of legal foreign workers in the labor force is extremely small. For instance, the  13
share of migrant workers, including illegal migrants, in the total labor force in Japan is 
less than one percent. In contrast, the same figure for France and Germany is around 
seven percent and it is as high as seventeen percent in Switzerland.   
 
Despite the limited number of skilled and professional migrant workers in Japan, there 
are two groups of migrant workers that have dramatically increased in recent years: (i) 
illegal unskilled workers from neighboring Asian countries, and (ii) legal Latin 
American workers of Japanese origin. These two groups will be discussed in the 
following sections.   
 
(2) Illegal Unskilled Workers 
 
Although the number of migrant workers (both legal and illegal) in Japan is still less 
than a million, it increased substantially since the mid-1980s until the severe economic 
recession curbed the inflow in the 1990s. As Figure 2 shows, the number of illegal 
foreign workers apprehended by the authorities sharply increased from 2,339 in 1983 to 
64,341 in 1993. Although the number declined slightly since then due to the severe 
recession of the Japanese economy, the number of illegal migrant workers is far greater 
than the level before the mid 1980s. Needless to say, these numbers represent only a 
small part of the total illegal foreign workers in Japan. According to the Ministry of 
Justice, the total number of illegal foreign workers in Japan is currently estimated to be 
about 200,000 to 300,000. 
 
Just as most illegal aliens in the United States come from Mexico and other neighboring 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, most illegal foreign workers in Japan 
come from neighboring Asian countries (see Table 10). Since the wage rate in their 
home countries is extremely low, even compared with a discriminatory low wage rate 
by Japanese standard, potential income gains are one of the main determinants of this 
migration.  
 
The recent influx of Asian workers is markedly different from earlier migrations. Until 
the mid 1980s most illegal foreign workers were women who worked as bar hostesses 
(the so-called "Japayuki San (Miss Japan-going)"). In 1983-84, for example, more than 
90 percent of illegal foreign workers were female. However, the number of male 
workers dramatically increased to about 50-80 percent of the total number of illegal 
immigrants (see Figure 2). As shown in Table 11, in 2004, about a quarter of the illegal 
male workers were construction workers, and 36 percent of female workers were bar 
hostesses. As in many other parts of the world, most illegal aliens are taking work that 
few Japanese want to do because of unfavorable working conditions. It should be noted 
that about two-thirds of the illegal migrants are working in the non-tradable sectors, 
such as construction and service industries. 
 
(3) Legal Unskilled Workers – Migrant Workers of Japanese Origin (Nikkeijin) 
 
In addition to the illegal foreign workers discussed above, there has been a remarkable  14
increase in the number of Nikkeijin workers. They come from Latin American countries 
with a history of Japanese immigration such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. The 
arrival of these workers is mainly due to the revised immigration law in Japan, which 
was enacted in 1989 and was put into effect in June 1990. Since the wage rate in Japan 
is much higher (and Japanese society is much safer) than that in Latin America, a great 
number of Latin Americans of Japanese origin were attracted to Japan. According to the 
media, some of these immigrants fell into huge debt to pay for their travel cost, and 
other people without Japanese origin were arrested for forgery of their birth certificate 
or for using some other person's identification. Figure 3 shows the increase in the 
number of Nikkeijin workers since 1988. While the number of Nikkeijin workers in 
Japan was only eight thousand at the end of 1988 (the year before the revised 
immigration law was enacted), it doubled every year to reach around 8,000 in June 1991. 
In 2004, the number of Nikkeijin staying in Japan was 250,734.   
 
4. Reasons for the Sharp Increase – Push and Pull 
 
Why did many unskilled foreign workers suddenly come to Japan after the middle of 
the 1980s? It is clear that the most important reason for the increase in the Nikkeijin 
workers from Latin America is the change in the Japanese immigration policy in 1990. 
In contrast, the reasons for the influx of illegal foreign workers from neighboring Asian 
countries are not so obvious. 
 
One of the most important factors is that a push-force in neighboring Asian countries 
coincided with a pull-force in the Japanese economy in the 1980s. As far as the supply 
side is concerned, one of the most important reasons for the sharp increase was probably 
the decline in the demand for Asian migrant workers in the Middle East. In the 1970s, 
an increasing number of Asians had been recruited to work at construction sites in the 
oil producing Middle Eastern countries. When the price of crude oil quadrupled after the 
First Oil Crisis in 1973, a construction boom occurred in the oil-rich countries. Given 
the relatively small population size of these countries in the Middle East, they started to 
recruit a large number of temporary immigrants mostly from southern Europe and Asia. 
As a result, the number of migrant workers from eight Asian countries (Bangladesh, 
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of 
Korea) to the Middle East grew from a little more than 0.1 million in 1976 to more than 
1.2 million in 1982. Nevertheless, as the price of crude oil went down in the 1980s, the 
construction boom in the Middle East subsided, and some 400,000 Asian migrant 
workers lost their jobs and had to return to their home countries. 
 
The return of these workers was a serious blow to the Asian sending countries, since 
remittances from the migrant workers had become an important source of foreign 
exchange. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example, remittances from migrant workers 
were almost as large as the total value of their exports. The slowdown in the Middle 
East created a large pool of Asian worker who were eager to find new jobs in some 
other countries. To these unemployed workers, Japan, one of their rich neighbors, 
appeared as the new land of opportunity.  15
 
The increase in the supply pressure coincided with the increased demand of Japanese 
businesses for migrant labor. Due to the strong performance of the Japanese economy, 
the labor market in Japan became very tight in the mid-1980s. The performance of the 
Japanese economy after the middle of the 1980s was impressive: the annual growth 
rates of the real GNP in 1988, 1989, and 1990 were 6.2 percent, 4.7 percent, and 5.6 
percent respectively; those of industrial production in 1988, 1989, and 1990 were 9.5 
percent, 6.1 percent, and 4.6 percent respectively. Consequently, the labor market 
became tight, and the job-opening/job-seeker ratio (one of the most commonly used 
indicators of the labor market condition in Japan) sharply increased. While the ratio 
nose-dived in 1975 (the First Oil Recession) and stayed at around 0.6 (i.e., only six jobs 
were available for every 10 job seekers), it began to increase after 1987. In 1988 the 
ratio exceeded one for the first time since 1974, and it went as high as 1.40 in 1990. The 
labor shortages were especially felt in the construction and service industries. Moreover, 
due to the decline in the number of domestic marginal workers (i.e., seasonal workers 
called "dekasegi"), the demand for migrant workers to fill the gap in this marginal labor 
market also increased. 
 
A typical practice of Japanese firms in boom years has been to increase the number of 
marginal workers, such as seasonal and temporary workers, because firms have at least 
a moral obligation to keep their regular employees on the payroll even in a recession. 
However, the construction industry was losing an important supply source of domestic 
non-regular workers. Until the 1980s, the labor shortage in the construction industry in 
boom years had been largely filled by seasonal workers, dekasegi. They were mostly 
farmers in the northern part of Japan who came to metropolitan areas like Tokyo and 
Osaka to take temporary jobs in an attempt to supplement their farm incomes in the 
farmers' slack season. In the early 1970s, the number of dekasegi amounted to about 
600,000 (Goto, 1990). However, because of increased job opportunities in their home 
towns the number began to diminish steadily. According to the Japanese Ministry of 
Labor, only 142,200 dekasegi were reported in 1993. The decline in the supply of 
dekasegi, along with the construction boom, created a serious labor shortage in the 
construction industry. The strong demand for marginal workers in the Japanese 
construction industry attracted an increasing number of foreign workers who were 
facing the decreasing demand for their labor in the Middle East.   
 
Given the strong push- and pull-forces, illegal mediators between Japanese employers 
and Asian migrants (like the "coyote" figure for Mexican illegal aliens in the United 
States) have become prevalent. Although the details of their illegal activities are 
unknown, involvement of gangsters has often been reported. According to an estimate 
by the Japanese Ministry of Justice, in 1990 about 70 percent of illegal migrant workers 
entered Japan with the help of such illegal mediators. 
 
IV. Nikkeijin Workers in Japan and the Japanese Government Policy towards them 
 
1.    Dramatic Increase since the Beginning of the 1990s  16
 
The influx of Nikkeijin workers in Japan is due to the revision of the Japanese 
immigration law in 1990. As mentioned above, foreigners are prohibited from taking 
unskilled jobs in Japan, in principle. However, the revision of the immigration law 
added a visa category of “long term resident (teijusha)”. The law allowed anyone whose 
parent or grandparent was Japanese (second and third generations) to apply for the 
“long term resident visa”. Long term residents can stay in Japan for three years, and 
they can take any activities in Japan including the unskilled work. As a result, a great 
number of Nikkeijin began to come to Japan to make quick money. Table 12 shows the 
number of “long term residents” by sending countries. As indicated in the table, in 2004, 
more than half (57.6%) of the long term residents were Brazilians. 
   
The increase in the number of Brazilians coming to Japan has been dramatic. Figure 4 
presents the number of Brazilians staying in Japan since 1988. While there were only 
4,159 Brazilians in Japan in 1988, the number jumped to 56,429 in 1990. Since then, the 
number of Brazilian immigrants has increased almost every year to 286,557 in 2004, 
which is seventy times as high as that in 1988. Moreover, many Brazilians are repeat 
migrants, who come back to Japan in a few years after they return to their home country. 
Table 13 shows the number of entry of Brazilians to Japan since 1999. As indicated, 
about half of Brazilians are repeat migrants.         
 
In the early 1990s, most of Nikkeijin workers in Japan were single males, who intended 
to stay for a few years and to return home with big money earned in Japan. They 
therefore remitted a large portion of their income to their home country. However, the 
Nikkeijin workers have begun to stay for a longer period and to live in Japan with their 
families. Some of them obtained permanent residency in Japan. The more they take root 
in Japan, the less remittance they may send to their home country. In the following 
section, I will first briefly discuss the situation of Nikkeijin workers in the early 1990s. 
Then I will examine what kind of changes emerged in the characteristics of Nikkeijin 
workers in more recent years, and discuss how these changes affect the amount of future 
remittances to their home country. 
 
2.  Nikkeijin Workers in the Early 1990s --Single Males in Car Parts Factory
2 
 
The Japanese Ministry of Labour published results of a survey on Nikkeijin workers in 
Japan in 1991, and the following discussion is mainly based on the outcome of this 
survey. According to the survey, about two thirds of the Nikkeijin were male, and the 
majority of them were under thirty years old. About two-thirds were coming to Japan 
without family, and only 13 percent were accompanied by their entire family. Almost all 
(more than 90 percent) of these males were working as production workers in the 
manufacturing sector. Of these, approximately one-third were employed in the transport 
equipment production sector (most of them in car parts factories). This constituted a 
striking contrast with illegal unskilled workers from Asia, who were employed mainly 
                                                  
2  The discussion in this subsection is largely based on Goto (1993).  17
in the non-tradable sectors, such as construction and services. 
 
In terms of working conditions in the early years, there was no substantial difference 
between the hourly wage of the Nikkeijin workers and that of their Japanese 
counterparts. Since Nikkeijin were legally employed, employers tended to pay them at 
regular hourly wage rates. However, the annual income of these Nikkeijin workers was 
much smaller than that of Japanese workers, because most of the Nikkeijin workers were 
employed on a daily basis and paid by the hour. Note that, in terms of wage structure, 
blue-collar production workers in Japan are similar to white-collar workers in the 
United States. Most of the blue-collar production workers in Japan receive a monthly 
salary (instead of hourly wages). Further, these salaried workers receive bonus 
payments twice a year and enjoy various fringe benefits. The bonus payment in Japan 
constitutes a substantial part of their annual income – the amount of average bonus is 
equal to five month salary. Therefore, even though the hourly wage rate of Nikkeijin 
workers was similar to that of the Japanese counterpart, their annual income was much 
smaller than Japanese workers because most of Nikkeijin workers did not receive bonus 
payment and fringe benefits. 
 
Moreover, the Nikkeijin workers were often exploited by brokers or mediators.  
According to the survey result, less than half of Nikkeijin workers were directly 
employed by the firm where they actually worked. More than half of Nikkeijin workers 
were employed by mediator agencies and were sent by them to the factories.
3 Hence  the 
actual income of Nikkeijin workers was usually smaller than what the factories were 
paying for their work. In some cases, exploitation by gangsters was also reported. In 
addition, the above survey reveals that most of the Nikkeijin workers were working 
without medical insurance and unemployment insurance.
4 In Japan almost 100 percent 
of workers (and their family) are covered by a very generous government-sponsored 
medical insurance program. Workers contribute to the medical insurance program 
according to their income and the deductibles are nominal. No matter how high the 
actual medical cost is, the payment out of the patient’s pocket does not exceed about 
500 dollars a month and the balance is paid by the insurance program. Very poor people 
can enjoy the same benefit as the others without contributing anything. Nevertheless, 
according to the survey, only 23 percent of the Nikkeijin workers were covered by the 
medical insurance program, probably because neither the employers nor the Nikkeijin 
workers themselves wanted to pay their contributions to the program. But this implies 
that in case of illness or accident these Nikkeijin workers had to pay 100 percent of their 
                                                  
3 As shown in Table 17, this wais still the case in 2003. In 2003 more than 64 percent of Nikkeijins are 
employed through mediators and contractors. 
4 Thanks to the efforts by central and local governments, most Nikkeijins  are now covered by the 
unemployment insurance system. However, many Nikkeijins are still outside of the coverage of medical 
insurance. The reason for the low coverage of medical insurance is believed that medical insurance and 
pension are presented as a package (i.e., if someone wishes to participate in the public medical insurance, 
he or she has to be enrolled in the national pension system as well). Since Nikkeijin does not think he or 
she would stay in Japan for more than twenty years, when he or she becomes eligible to receive pension), 
he or she tends to decline the public medical insurance in order to avoid contribution to the pension 
system.  18
medical expenses out of pocket. 
 
3. Nikkeijin Workers in Recent Years: Settlers with Family 
 
(1) From Temporary Guest Workers to Settlers 
 
When an increasing number of Brazilian Nikkeijin began to come to Japan in the early 
1990s, most of them were “dekasegi” workers (i.e., temporary guest workers), who 
stayed in Japan just for a few years and went back to their home country with a fortune 
made in Japan. However, in recent years, the Brazilians have begun to settle in Japan, 
just as the Japanese emigrants did in Brazil about 100 years earlier. Figure 5 shows the 
result of a survey on Nikkeijin’s length of stay in Japan, which was conducted by 
Sangyo Koyo Antei Sentah (Industry Employment Security Center) in 2002. As the 
table indicates, almost 80 percent of Nikkeijin workers stayed in Japan for more than 
three years. Twenty-eight percent of them stayed in Japan for more than 10 years. This 
is probably due to the fact that it was very difficult for Nikkeijin dekasegi workers to 
quickly make a great amount of money under the stagnant Japanese economy. In 
addition, it was hard for them to find good jobs in Brazil after returning home due to the 
Brazilian stagnant economy. Although the long-term resident visa is valid only for three 
years initially, the Japanese government is generous to allow those Brazilians to apply 
for renewals. Unless they commit a crime, the renewal is almost automatic. 
 
After two or three renewals, they can apply even for a permanent resident visa, which is 
extremely difficult to obtain for foreigners other than Nikkeijin. As a result, the number 
of permanent residents from Brazil has been rapidly increasing in recent years. Table 14 
presents the change in the number of permanent residents by nationality since 2000.  
As indicated in the table, the overall number of permanent residents increased only by 
18 percent from 657,605 in 2000 to 778,583 in 2004. However, the increase for 
Brazilians is remarkable. While there were only 9,062 permanent residents from Brazil 
in 2000, the number in 2004 (52,581) was almost six times larger. As a result, while the 
Brazilian dekasegi workers used to predominantly be on a long-term resident visa in the 
early 1990s, the share of long term residents decreased to about half (52%) of the total 
Brazilians staying in Japan in 2002 (see Figure 6). Thirty-four percent of Brazilians 
entered Japan with a visa for spouse etc. of Japanese citizens, and 12 percent were 
staying in Japan with a permanent resident visa in that year.     
 
As Nikkeijin from Brazil stay longer in Japan, they bring their family to Japan. The male 
dekasegi workers started to bring their wives and children from Brazil. Table 15 shows 
such a tendency. The table compares the number of Brazilians by age and gender in 
2002 with those in 1992. The share of working-age Brazilians (15 to 64 years old) in 
1992 was 91.5 percent, but it dropped to 84.4 percent by 2002. On the other hand, the 
share of children (0-14 years old) increased by seven percentage points from 8.3 percent 
in 1992 to 15.2 percent in 2002.     
 
As discussed in detail below, the increase in spouses and children has generated various  19
problems including those related to the education of their children in Japan and daily 
life in the Japanese community. 
 
(2) Clustered Cities 
 
Nikkeijin migrants from Brazil tend to be clustered in certain cities and towns, where 
employment in the manufacturing industry is available. About 60 percent of foreign 
residents are clustered in 15 towns and cities as shown in Table 16. The table indicates 
the share of foreign residents (and Brazilians) in total population in each municipality. 
While the share of Brazilians in the total population of Japan is 0.21 percent, the 
Brazilian shares in the population of these fifteen cities are much higher than the 
national average. For example, in Oizumi Town in Gunma Prefecture, where the number 
of total population is 41,284, more than 4,000 inhabitants are Brazilian. The share of 
Brazilians in Oizumi Town thus exceeds 10 percent (11.4%). In certain living districts in 
these cities, the concentration is even greater. For instance, in Homi Housing District in 
Toyota City in Aichi Prefecture where about 10,000 people are living, the number of 
Brazilians is as high as 4,000, or 40 percent. Since very few Brazilians speak Japanese, 
and since social custom in Japan is very different from that in Brazil, the Brazilians 
often encounter various problems: e.g. while a party with Samba music at midnight 
might be common in Brazil, such behavior often results in a serious conflict with 
Japanese neighbors. 
 
Due to the clustering, the municipal governments of the cities with a large number of 
foreign residents, mostly Brazilians, face many challenges. In May 2001, mayors from 
13 municipal governments of such cities formed “Gaikokujin Shuju Toshi Kaigi 
(Congress of Major Cities where Foreign Residents Concentrate to Live)”. This was an 
attempt to achieve harmonious living by foreign residents in these Japanese 
communities.   
 
As for employment of the Nikkeijin workers, Table 17 shows that almost all of them 
(86.0%) are employed in the manufacturing industry. That is different from other 
(illegal) foreign unskilled workers, most of who are employed in the service sectors. It 
should be noted that two-thirds (64.3%) of Nikkeijin workers obtain employment 
through private mediators and contractors as mentioned above.   
 
The municipalities with the concentration of foreign residents provide public housing to 
foreigners. Table 18 shows the current rate of foreign households’ occupancy of public 
housing in selected municipalities. In these cities, more than 10% (13.7%) of public 
housing is occupied by foreign residents. This is particularly true in Iwata City in 
Shizuoka Prefecture where more than a quarter of public housing is occupied by foreign 
residents. 
 
(3) Problems with Education and Crime 
 
The increased number of children of Nikkeijin workers has caused various problems, of  20
which the education of Nikkeijin children and their high crime rates are two primary 
concerns. As Table 15 shows, the number of school-age children (5-14 years) tripled in 
10 years. While the number of school-age children was 7,244 in 1992, it increased to 
23,610 in 2002. It is surprising to observe a high non-attendance ratio among Nikkeijin 
children. One of the main reasons for the poor attendance is their lack of Japanese 
language skills, which poses difficulties in following the class. Another possible 
explanation is the high tuition fees of Brazilian-language schools in Japan. Table 19 
shows the number of school-age foreign residents and the number of the school 
enrolment in cities where foreign residents are concentrated. As indicated in the table, 
absenteeism of foreign children, mostly Nikkeijin children, is appalling. More than a 
quarter of Nikkeijin children do not attend school, which is a striking difference 
compared to the enrollment rate of Japanese children that is 99.9 percent.     
 
Absenteeism often results in juvenile delinquency. Table 20 summarizes the change in 
the number of criminal offences by Brazilians and Peruvians since 1992. Between 1992 
and 2002, for instance, the number of foreign residents from Brazil increased by 80 
percent from 147,803 to 268,332. The number of criminal offences committed by 
Brazilians also increased dramatically. In 2002 the number of crimes committed by 
Brazilian reached 4,967, which is 22 times larger than that in 1992 (222). That 
constitutes a sharp contrast with Peruvians in Japan. While there is no clear increase in 
criminal offences by Peruvians, those committed by Brazilians have increased sharply 
in recent years. Moreover, the number of criminal offences per Brazilian resident is 
much higher than that of Peruvians. Criminal offences are particularly serious among 
Brazilian juveniles. Brazil tops the rank in terms of the number of juvenile crimes 
committed by foreign residents in Japan. 
 
(4) Policies of the Japanese Governments towards Nikkeijin in Japan 
 
Faced with the increasing number of Nikkeijin workers and their families in the country, 
the Japanese governments, both central and local, are taking various policy measures to 
assist the living of Nikkeijin, and to achieve harmonious coexistence of Japanese and 
Nikkeijin. The following is a partial listing of such policy measures. 
 
(i) Measures taken by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 
* Interpreters of Portuguese and Spanish at 62 public employment security offices 
* Job counseling specially designed for Nikkeijin Workers at the employment service 
centers for Nikkeijin (at Tokyo and Aichi Prefecture) 
* Job counseling for prospective dekasegi workers in São Paulo 
* Leaflets on job openings in Portuguese and Spanish 
* Assistance to Nikkeijin juveniles to find jobs in Japan 
 
(ii) Measures taken by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology 
* Special teachers who give necessary assistance to non Japanese-speaking students 
* School counselors who assist students and parents coming from abroad  21
* Special curriculum for non Japanese-speaking students 
 
(iii) Measures taken by the local governments (especially of clustered cities) 
* Leaflets and newsletters in foreign language (Portuguese, Spanish, English etc.) on the 
life in Japan 
* Counseling centers in various foreign languages 
* Free medical examinations for foreign residents 
* Special personnel to assist students from foreign countries 




In many developing countries, e.g. the Philippines, remittances are a very important 
source of income. This is also the case in Brazil. According to Beltrão and Sonoe (2006), 
remittances by Nikkeijin workers in Japan are estimated to be US$2 billion annually, 
almost equal to the annual exports from Brazil to Japan.   
 
There are a few studies on the amount of remittances to Brazil from each Nikkeijin 
worker. Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Kikou (Japan Institute of Labour) conducted interviews in 
1993 and 1998 among Nikkeijin in Brazil who had working experience in Japan.
5 
According to the survey, average monthly remittances from each dekasegi worker were 
US$1,664 and US$1848 in 1993 and 1998 respectively. In 1993 the average amount of 
monthly remittance (US$1,664) was almost three times higher than the average monthly 
income in Brazil (US$623). Also in 1998, the amount of monthly remittances 
(US$1,848) was a little higher than monthly income in Brazil (US$1,806).   
 
Commissioned by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Microfinance 
International Corporation (2005) did a similar study on remittances of Latin Americans 
working in Japan.
6  This study reports that seventy percent of Latin Americans working 
in Japan remit regularly. According to the study, these migrants remit 14.5 times a year, 
and the average amount of remittance each time is US$600. This implies that they remit 
US$8,700 annually, and that the average amount of monthly remittance is US$725, 
which is far less than the amount based on the study by the Japan Institute of Labor. 
 
While the amount of total remittances by Nikkeijin workers in Japan is enormous at 
present, the current level of remittance flows from Japan to Brazil may not last in the 
future. As discussed above, an increasing number of Nikkeijin workers are changing 
status from temporary dekasegi workers to settlers in Japan. In 2004 the number of 
permanent residents from Brazil exceeded 50,000, and the number has been increasing 
rapidly in recent years. The longer they stay, the less they might remit. The history of 
Turkish guest workers in Germany has shown the decline in the amount of remittances 
sent back to Turkey as the guest workers settled in the host country.     
                                                  
5  See Appendix II for the methodology used for these surveys. 
6  See Appendix II for the methodology used for this survey.  22
 
V. Limitation of the Existing Literature and the Brazil Nikkei Household Survey 
 
This paper has presented a descriptive account of the migration of Nikkeijin to Japan 
based on the available data and existing studies. While some data on the Nikkei migrants 
and remittances sent to Brazil are available, most of the data are available only at the 
aggregate level, not at the household level, and there seems to be some discrepancy 
even among the existing data as noted earlier. A more serious problem is, however, the 
absence of microeconomic data at the household-level for the Japan-Brazil corridor, 
which would allow us to empirically analyze the migration and remittance behavior of 
Nikkeijin and examine their welfare implications. In order to fill this gap, the World 
Bank Research Group is conducting the Brazil Nikkei Household Survey among the 
Japanese community in Brazil at the time of writing the present paper. 
 
The primary objective of this survey is to ascertain key determinants and constraints of 
migration by Nikkeijin to, settlement in, and return from Japan. The survey also aims to 
examine the socioeconomic and welfare impacts of migration and remittances on Nikkei 
households. The survey contains usual questions included in household surveys such as 
those on demographic composition of households, education level and economic 
activities of household members, information on housing conditions and ownership of 
durable goods. In addition, it incorporates migration-related questions specific to each 
group of respondents, namely households with returned migrants, those with current 
migrants, and those which do not have any household member who ever migrated to 
Japan. The survey, for instance, asks the main reasons for migrating to Japan (or for not 
migrating to Japan), the economic activity in Brazil before migrating (and after 
returning to Brazil for returned migrants) as well as in Japan, the duration of stay in 
Japan, the types of visa obtained upon arrival (and upon departure), whether the 
migrants had any network (i.e., friends, families or other acquaintances) in Japan, and 
the frequency and method of contact with the other household members left in Brazil. 
 
The survey also contains questions regarding remittances. For instance, it asks 
households whether they receive any remittances from Japan, and if they do so, how 
they receive and how they spend them. It also asks about each household’s general 
accessibility to and use of financial services. If the household has any returned or 
current migrant, the survey asks which method he/she uses/used for remitting money to 
Brazil, and what factors affected the choice of the method used. 
 
Another non-trivial contribution of this survey will be the assessment of different survey 
sampling methodologies to collect representative data through household survey 
questionnaires for applied microeconomic analysis of migration and remittance 
corridors.
7 The survey will firstly implement a “random stratified sampling frame” 
based on the available census data. It will then implement two alternative 
                                                  
7  See McKenzie and Mistiaen (2007) for more detailed discussion on the experiment of different 
sampling methodologies.  23
methodologies, namely “snowball sampling” and “intercept sampling” techniques. The 
former is a technique where a sampling frame will be built up from a certain number of 
“seed” Nikkei households, i.e., these seed households are asked to provide referrals to 
other households with the Nikkeijin  community. In contrast, the latter involves 
interviews taking place during set time periods at a number of pre-specified 
well-defined locations that are frequented by Nikkeijin. These two alternatives are a 
non-probability sampling technique. It is obviously more ideal to obtain data based on a 
probability sampling. However, it is generally a difficult task to construct a sampling 
frame for sub-groups of population who migrate, send or receive remittances. The fact 
that these sub-groups are typically “rare elements” in the population makes this task 
hard. The findings of the survey will therefore help us assess how representative data 
the alternative sampling approaches can generate in case the probability-sampling 
technique is not feasible or too costly. 
 
In sum, given the relatively extensive and detailed questions of the survey, this dataset 
will certainly advance our understanding of not only the Japan-Brazil migration and 
remittance corridor, but also of migration and remittance behavior in general. The data 
will also allow us to investigate the robustness of some of the existing findings on the 
Japan-Brazil corridor presented in this paper. Finally, the outcome of the survey will 
have some methodological contributions to migration-related studies. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has examined the background and major characteristics of Nikkeijin workers 
in Japan. Section II examined the history of Japanese emigration to Latin America 
(mostly Brazil). Section III discussed immigration in Japan in general. In response to 
the revision of the immigration law and the relatively straightforward procedure for 
renewing visas and also for obtaining permanent residency for Nikkeijin, the share of 
Nikkeijin workers in the total migrant workers in Japan dramatically increased in the 
1990s. Section IV discussed the main characteristics of Nikkeijin workers in Japan. 
Nikkeijin workers in the early 1990s were mostly temporary guest workers, who 
intended to return home in a few years with a fortune made in Japan. However, they 
have gradually begun to settle in Japan with their families. Since Nikkeijin are clustered 
in certain cities (e.g. Hamamatsu, Toyota, Toyoshashi, and Oizumi), the social and 
economic impacts of Nikkeijin workers on these cities are enormous. Governments, as 
well as NGOs, are therefore making various efforts to create harmonious living of 
Nikkeijin workers in Japanese communities. Section IV pointed out that, while the 
current amount of remittances by Nikkeijin is non-trivial, this may not last in the future, 
because the amount of remittances tends to decline as migrant workers start settling in 
the destination country. 
 
Although I have presented various data on Nikkeijin workers in Japan, more studies on 
Nikkeijin and remittances are clearly needed. First, while there are various studies on the 
characteristics of Nikkeijin workers and remittances, most of them are based on ad hoc 
interviews, and therefore the results vary widely from study to study. For example,  24
according to the study by the Japan Institute of Labor, the average amount of monthly 
remittances was about $1,664 -- $1,848, while the study commissioned by the IDB 
reported a far smaller amount of $725. Thus, accumulation of ad hoc survey results do 
not seem very useful for understanding Nikkeijin workers in Japan and future prospect 
of remittances from those workers. Secondly, an econometric study is clearly needed in 
addition to descriptive analyses. In order to forecast the future remittances, for instance, 
it would be useful to estimate elasticity of the amount of remittances with respect to, say, 
the length of stay, and the number of family members in each Nikkeijin household. For 
these ends, the availability of the Brazil Nikkei Household Survey data described in 
Section V will certainly help us deepen our understanding of the migration and 
remittance behavior of Nikkei migrants and their future prospects.    25
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Table 1: Number of 
Nikkeijin in Brazil 
(1923-2006, estimates) 









Source: Carvalho (2003). 
 
share (%) number share (%)
Post-1945 Total
0.19 165 0.05
Source: Compiled from the data in Carvalho (2003).
Others 4 0.00 161
0.00 18 0.01
Venezuela 12 0.00 0.00 12 0.00
Uruguay 18 0.01
11.12 10,133 2.95
Peru 33,07 12.84 2,615 3.03 35,685 10.37
Paraguay 521 0.20 9,612
0.78 15,147 4.40
Panama 415 0.16 0.00 415 0.12
Mexico 14,476 5.62 671
0.00 686 0.20
Dominica 0.00 1,39 1.61 1,39 0.40
Cuba 686 0.27
0.00 519 0.15
Colombia 229 0.09 0.00 229 0.07
Chile 519 0.20
7.36 6,559 1.91
Brazil 202,025 78.43 53,555 61.97 255,58 74.30
Bolivia 202 0.08 6,357
100.00 344,002 100.00
Argentina 5,398 2.10 12,066 13.96 17,464 5.08
Total 257,575 100.00 86,427
Table 2: Japanese emigrants to Latin American countries
1899-1941
number share (%) number
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Year Number Year Number Year Number Year Number Year Number
1908 830 1924 2 673 1940 1 268 1956 4 912 1972 352
1909 31 1925 6 333 1941 1 548 1957 6 147 1973 492
1910 948 1926 8 407 1942 0 1958 6 586 1974 239
1911 28 1927 9 084 1943 0 1959 7 123 1975 254
1912 2 909 1928 11 169 1944 0 1960 7 746 1976 1 126
1913 7 122 1929 16 648 1945 0 1961 6 824 1977 682
1914 3 675 1930 14 074 1946 6 1962 1978 584
1915 65 1931 5 632 1947 1 1963 2 124 1979 500
1916 165 1932 11 678 1948 1 1964 1 138 1980 562
1917 3 899 1933 24 494 1949 4 1965 903 1981 417
1918 5 599 1934 21 930 1950 33 1966 937 1982 329
1919 3 022 1935 9 611 1951 106 1967 1 070 1983 289
1920 1 013 1936 3 306 1952 261 1968 597 1984 261
1921 840 1937 4 557 1953 1 928 1969 496 1985 258
1922 1938 2 524 1954 3 119 1970 435 1986 363
1923 895 1939 1 414 1955 4 051 1971 452 Total ######
Source: Carvalho (2003)




Table 4: Crop Share of Nikkeijin Farmers in Brazil 
  1912 1922 1932 1942 1958 
      
Coffee 92.6  52.2 59 24.3 27.5
Rice 2.5  17.6 8.3 4.5 3
Cotton 1.2  12.1 14 39.2 20.5
Kinko 0.6  10.2 13 19.9 34.1
Other  3.1 7.9 5.7 12.1 14.9
   
Total  100 100 100 100 100






Table 5: National Income of Selected OECD Countries
GDP  GDP per capita 
(Value, in $billions)  (Value, in $)
Japan  USA  UK Germany Japan USA UK Germany
1950  109  2883  377 234 131 1897 744 468
1960  440  5153  727 722 468 2852 1390  1302
1970  2033  10155  1249 1846 1949 4952 2254  3041
1980  10632  27319  5353 8185 9103 11996 9567  13296
1990  30522  58033  9946 15470 24718 23209 17377 24458
2000  47661  98247  14409 18752 37574 34796 24571 22844
(Index, USA=100.0)     (Index, USA=100.0)
Japan  USA  UK Germany Japan USA UK Germany
1950  3.8  100.0  13.1 8.1 6.9 100.0 39.2  24.7 
1960  8.5  100.0  14.1 14.0 16.4 100.0 48.7  45.7 
1970  20.0  100.0  12.3 18.2 39.4 100.0 45.5  61.4 
1980  38.9  100.0  19.6 30.0 75.9 100.0 79.8  110.8
1990  52.6  100.0  17.1 26.7 106.5 100.0 74.9  105.4
2000  48.5  100.0  14.7 19.1 108.0 100.0 70.6  65.7 
(Source) IMF  29
 
Table 6:    Foreign Population in Selected Countries 
                  [1990] 
   Total population  Foreign population  Foreigner ratio 
   (thousand)  (thousand)  (%) 
           
East/Southeast Asia  652,927 7,594  1.2 
   Japan  123,267 1,075  0.9 
   Korea  42,663 900  2.1 
   Malaysia  17,670 745  4.2 
   Singapore  2,690 418  15.5 
   Taiwan  19,080 1,508  7.9 
   Hong Kong  5,680 2,271  40.0 
   Thailand  55,138 314  0.6 
        
North America  276,384 23,868  8.6 
   Canada  27,606 4,266  15.5 
   United States  248,778 19,603  7.9 
        
Europe  498,740 24,908  5.0 
   France  56,563 5,897  10.4 
   Germany  79,195 5,037  6.4 
   Switzerland  6,804 1,092  16.0 
   United Kingdom  57,332 3,718  6.5 
        
Latin America  402,285 6,550  1.6 
   Argentina  32,325 1,675  5.2 
   Brazil  147,134 1,138  0.8 
        
World  5,926,830 120,000  2.0 
Source: United Nations, Japanese Ministry of Labor, U.S. Census Bureau    30
 
Table 7 
The changes in aggregate number of registered foreigners (as of end of each year) 




The share in total 
population of Japan (%) 
1978 766,894      39  0.67 
1979 774,505  1.0    39  0.67 
1980 782,910  1.1 40  0.67 
1981 792,946  1.3 40  0.67 
1982 802,477  1.2 41  0.68 
1983 817,129  1.8 41  0.68 
1984 840,885  2.9 43  0.70   
1985 850,612  1.2 43  0.70   
1986 867,237  2   44  0.71 
1987 884,025  1.9 45  0.72 
1988 941,005  6.4 48  0.77 
1989 984,455  4.6 50  0.80   
1990 1,075,317  9.2  54  0.87 
1991 1,218,891  13.4  62  0.98 
1992 1,281,644  5.1  65  1.03 
1993 1,320,748  3.1  67  1.06 
1994 1,354,011  2.5  69  1.08 
1995 1,362,371  0.6  69  1.08 
1996 1,415,136  3.9  72  1.12 
1997 1,482,707  4.8  75  1.18 
1998  1,512,116  2.0   77  1.20  
1999 1,556,113  2.9  79  1.23 
2000 1,686,444  8.4  85  1.33 
2001 1,778,462  5.5  90  1.40   
2002 1,851,758  4.1  94  1.45 
2003 1,915,030  3.4  97  1.50   
2004 1,973,747  3.1  100  1.55 
Sources: Japanese Ministry of Justice.  31
 
Table 8: Number of registered foreigners by sending region (as of the end of the year) 
2004 
Region  2000 2001 2002 2003 
    Share (%) 
Percentage change 
from the end of the 
previous year (%) 
Total  1,686,444 1,778,462 1,851,758 1,915,030 1,973,747 100.0 3.1
Asia  1,244,629 1,311,449 1,371,171 1,422,979 1,464,360 74.2 2.9
South America  312,921 329,510 334,602 343,635 358,211 18.2 4.2
North America  58,100 60,492 63,201 63,271 64,471 3.3 1.9
Europe  47,730 51,497 55,288 57,163 58,429 3.0 2.2
Oceania  12,839 14,697 15,898 16,076 16,131 0.8 0.3
Africa  8,214 8,876 9,694 10,060 10,319 0.5 2.6
Stateless  2,011 1,941 1,904 1,846 1,826 0.1 -1.1




Table 9: FOREIGN WORKERS IN JAPAN (2002) 
 





Migrant workers of Japanese origin 
(233,897) 
 






Total Labor Force In Japan 
66,490,000 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Labor. 
 
 
Table 10: Illegal Foreign Workers Apprehended, by Country of Origin (2004)               
              Number               Share (%) 
   Total  Male  Female Total Male  Female 
Total  55,351   31,100  24,251  100.0  56.2   43.8 
China  15,702   9,536  6,166  100.0  60.7   39.3 
Taiwan (China)  503   156  347  100.0  31.0   69.0 
Hong Kong  66   37  29  100.0  56.1   43.9 
Philippines  8,558   2,975  5,583  100.0  34.8   65.2 
Korea  7,782   2,781  5,001  100.0  35.7   64.3 
Thailand  3,572   1,384  2,188  100.0  38.7   61.3 
Indonesia  2,103   1,463  640  100.0  69.6   30.4 
Malaysia  1,575   1,141  434  100.0  72.4   27.6 
Myanmar  1,466   1,179  287  100.0  80.4   19.6 
Brazil  1,338   833  505  100.0  62.3   37.7 
Bangladesh  1,312   1,215  97  100.0  92.6   7.4 
Peru  1,292   775  517  100.0  60.0   40.0 
Other  10,082   7,625  2,457  100.0  75.6   24.4 




Table 11: Illegal Foreign Workers Apprehended, by Activities (2004) 
         Number  Share (%) 
Male Total      25,348  100.0 
   Factory worker  7,401  29.2 
   Construction worker*  6,185  24.4 
   Cook*     2,591  10.2 
   Unskilled help*  2,185  8.6 
   Bartender *  1,401  5.5 
   Dish washer*  1,112  4.4 
   Other     4,473  17.6 
   (Nontraded)  13,474  53.2 
             
Female Total      17,710  100.0 
   Bar hostess*  6,368  36.0 
   Factory worker  3,038  17.2 
   Waitress*     2,070  11.7 
   Other service*  1,670  9.4 
   Cook*     1,001  5.7 
   Dishwasher*  973  5.5 
   Other     2,590  14.6 
   (Nontraded)  12,082  68.2 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice     
Note: "Nontraded" is the summation of activities with an asterisk (*). 
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Table 12: Number of foreign resident with "long term resident" visa (as of the end of the year) 
2004 
Nationality     (place  of  birth)  2000  2001  2002  2003 




change from the 
end of the 
previous year 
(%) 
Total  237,607 244,460 243,451 245,147 250,734 100.0 2.3
Brazil  137,649 142,082 139,826 140,552 144,407 57.6 2.7
China  37,337 36,580 35,020 33,292 32,130 12.8 -3.5
Philippines  13,285 15,530 18,246 21,117 23,756 9.5 12.5
Peru  21,369 22,047 21,538 21,045 20,779 8.3 -1.3
South Korea /    Korea  9,509 9,243 9,091 8,941 8,751 3.5 -2.1
Others  18,458 18,978 19,730 20,200 20,911 8.3 3.5
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice. 
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Table 13: Entry of Brazilians to Japan 
        
Year Total First  comer  Repeater   
            
 Number           
1999 70,794  38,275  32,519   
2000 101,513  58,577  42,936   
2001 81,800  39,533  42,267   
2002 71,763  33,296  38,467   
2003 79,692  41,101  38,591   
            
 Share  (%)           
1999 100.0  54.1  45.9   
2000 100.0  57.7  42.3   
2001 100.0  48.3  51.7   
2002 100.0  46.4  53.6   
2003 100.0  51.6  48.4   
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.     







Table 14: Number of the permanent residents by nationality (as of the end of the year) 
 
Nationality            












from the end of the 
previous year (%) 
Permanent resident  657,605 684,853 713,775 742,963 778,583 100.0 4.8
  General permanent resident  145,336 184,071 223,875 267,011 312,964 40.2 17.2
   China  48,809 58,778 70,599 83,321 96,647 12.4 16.0
   Brazil  9,062 20,277 31,203 41,771 52,581 6.8 25.9
   Philippines  20,933 26,967 32,796 39,733 47,407 6.1 19.3
    South Korea / Korea  31,955 34,624 37,121 39,807 42,960 5.5 7.9
   Peru  7,496 11,059 13,975 17,213 20,401 2.6 18.5
   Others  27,081 32,366 38,181 45,166 52,968 6.8 17.3
  Special permanent resident  512,269 500,782 489,900 475,952 465,619 59.8 -2.2
    South Korea / Korea  507,429 495,986 485,180 471,756 461,460 59.3 -2.2
   China  4,151 4,060 3,924 3,406 3,306 0.4 -2.9
  Others  689 736 796 790 853 0.1 8.0




Table 15: The number of foreign residents by age and gender (Brazilian) 
(A) End of 1992 
           
Age   Brazil  Composition 
ratio 
  Male  Composition 
ratio 
 Female  Composition 
ratio 
Total 147,803  100.0% 87,679 59.3% 60,124  40.7%
0-4  year  5,082 3.4% 2,541 2.9% 2,541 4.2%
5-14  year  7,244 4.9% 3,682 4.2% 3,562 5.9%
15-19  year  12,997 8.8% 7,550 8.6% 5,447 9.1%
20-64 year  122,269  82.7% 73,760 84.1% 48,509  80.7%
over 65 years of age  211  0.1% 146 0.2% 65  0.1%
   
(B) End of 2002         
           
Age   Brazil  Composition 
ratio 
  Male  Composition 
ratio 
 Female  Composition 
ratio 
Total 268,332  100.0% 147,322 54.9% 121,010  45.1%
0-4  year  17,264 6.4% 8,852 6.0% 8,412 7.0%
5-14  year  23,610 8.8% 12,035 8.2% 11,575 9.6%
15-19  year  16,106 6.0% 8,397 5.7% 7,709 6.4%
20-64 year  209,702  78.2% 117,214 79.6% 92,488  76.4%
over 65 years of age  1,650  0.60% 824 0.6% 826  0.7%
Source: "Foreign residents statistics" from Japanese Ministry of Justice. 
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Table 16: Number of foreign residents in municipalities where foreign residents concentrate to live   
   Total  population 
The number of 
foreign resident 
The number of 
Brazilian 
resident 
The proportion of 
Brazilian in total 
population 
Ota City,Gunma  149,599 7,203 3,390  2.3%
Oizumi Town, Gunma  41,284 6,166 4,704  11.4%
Iida City, Nagano  109,434 2,873 1,380  1.3%
Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka  596,988 21,434 12,712  2.1%
Iwata City, Shizuoka  90,128 4,392 3,301  3.7%
Kosai City, Shizuoka  44,601 2,549 1,818  4.1%
Fuji City, Shizuoka  242,392 4,494 1,850  0.8%
Toyohashi City, Aichi  372,986 15,417 9,655  2.6%
Toyota City, Aichi  344,549 11,381 6,251  1.8%
Ogaki City, Gifu  154,048 5,397 3,432  2.2%
Kani City, Gifu  96,203 3,854 3,015  3.1%
Minokamo City, Gifu  50,820 3,373 2,438  4.8%
Yokkaichi City, Mie  289,797 7,234 3,127  1.1%
Suzuka City, Mie  187,425 7,046 3,851  2.1%
Ueno City, Mie  59,626 3,041 1,999  3.4%
Total 2,829,880 105,854 62,923  2.2%
（National Data, whole Japan） 126,688,364 1,851,758 268,332  0.2%
Source: The data from each municipality. 
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Table 17: The employment situation of non-Japanese and Nikkeijin from Latin America (as of June 1, 2003) 
       
   
non-Japanese who 
come from Latin 
America  Composition ratio 
(Of those) Nikkeijin 
from Latin America 
Composition ratio 
The total number of direct labor  61,172  100.0% 55,193 100.0% 
                
(by industry)              
Manufacturing industry  51,980  85.0% 47,444 86.0% 
Service sector  4,524  7.4% 3,708 6.7% 
Wholesale and retail trade  669  1.1% 571 1.0% 
Restaurant, lodging industry  271  0.4% 205 0.4% 
Instruction, learning assistance service  189  0.3% 80 0.1% 
Others  3,539 5.8% 3,185 5.8% 
                
The labor who takes up employment with a business establishment 
which primarily performing labor dispatch or contracting business   
38,542 63.0% 35,469 64.3% 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare. 
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Table 18: The foreign household's occupancy status of the public housing in municipalities where foreign residents concentrate to 
live (the end of March, 2002)     
    The total number of households 
The number of foreign 
households 
The proportion of foreign 
households 
Ota City,Gunma  3,505  355 10.1%
Oizumi Town, Gunma  698  96 13.8%
Iida City, Nagano  1,103  145 13.1%
Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka  7,413  951 12.8%
Iwata City, Shizuoka  623  116 18.6%
Kosai City, Shizuoka  516  146 28.3%
Fuji City, Shizuoka  2,765  183 6.6%
Toyohashi City, Aichi  6,694  1,159 17.3%
Toyota City, Aichi  7,176  1,450 20.2%
Ogaki City, Gifu  1,197  27 2.3%
Kani City, Gifu  227  4 1.8%
Minokamo City, Gifu  266  26 9.8%
Yokkaichi City, Mie  5,639  670 11.9%
Suzuka City, Mie  2,084  129 6.2%
Total  39,906 5,457 13.7%

















Ota City,Gunma 502 233 91 178 35.5%
Oizumi Town, Gunma 646 313 109 224 34.7%
Iida City, Nagano 195 149 0 46 23.6%
Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka 1,556 873 358 325 20.9%
Iwata City, Shizuoka 270 118 91 61 22.6%
Kosai City, Shizuoka 169 116        unknown 58 34.3%
Fuji City, Shizuoka 274 191 0 83 30.3%
Toyohashi City, Aichi 1,100 644 250 206 18.7%
Toyota City, Aichi 819 431 236 75 9.1%
Ogaki City, Gifu 364 212        unknown 152 41.8%
Kani City, Gifu 258 91 74 93 36.0%
Minokamo City, Gifu 238 110 74 54 22.7%
Yokkaichi City, Mie 461 274 109 78 16.9%
Suzuka City, Mie 497 167 50 280 56.3%
Total 7,349 3,922 1,442 1,913 26.0%
＊The current state of school attendance of foreign residents ready for school (2002)
Sources:Gaikokujin Shuju Toshi Kaigi (Congress of Major Cities where Foreign Residents Concentrate to Live)
Tabel 19





Table 20: Criminal Offences by Brazilians and Peruvians   
   
    1992 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
increasing rate 
The number of foreign resident  1,281,644 1,512,116 1,556,113 1,686,444 1,778,462 1,851,758 4.1% 
  Brazilian 147,803 222,217 224,299 254,394 265,962 268,332 0.9% 
  Peruvian 31,051 41,317 42,773 46,171 50,052 51,772 3.4% 
Number of Offence  12,153 31,779 34,398 30,971 27,763 34,746 25.2% 
  Number of Criminal Offence  7,457 21,689 25,135 22,947 18,199 24,258 33.3% 
    Brazilian 222 3,278 5,110 3,273 3,457 4,967 43.7% 
    Peruvian 331 1,023 1,250 482 425 436 2.6% 











































































































































































  Source: Japanese Prime Minister’s Office.  44
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  Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.  45
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    Source:  Japanese  Ministry  of  Justice.  46
 


























Figure 5: Nikkeijin's Length of Stay in Japan













    Note:  The  data  for  2002. 
        Source: Sangyo Koyo Antei Sentah (Industry Employment Security Center). 
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  Note: The data for 2002. 
  Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice.  48
APPENDIX I: Chronology of the Japanese Emigration 
 
1868 Meiji  Restoration 
  About 500 Japanese immigrants arrived in Hawaii. 
  About 40 Japanese immigrants arrived in Guam. 
1869  About 40 Japanese immigrants arrived in California. 
1885  Official migration agreement was concluded between the governments of Japan 
 and  Hawaii. 
  First “official” immigrants from Japan arrived in Hawaii (943 people) 
1888  Emancipation of slaves in Brazil 
1894  “Migrants Protection Regulation (Imin Hogo Kisoku)” was issued by the Japanese 
government charging private migration companies with recruiting and sending 
emigrants. 
1895  Diplomatic relations were opened between Japan and Brazil 
1899  Japanese bonded workers arrived in Peru (790 people) 
1903  Japanese bonded workers arrived in the Philippines (about 3,000 people) 
1907  A Japan-U.S. Gentlemen’s Agreement was signed, which severely restricted 
  Japanese immigration to the United States 
1908  “Kasado-maru”, which carried 791 Japanese immigrants, arrived in the port of 
  Santos, Brazil. Almost all of these immigrants were bonded workers on coffee 
 plantations. 
1909  Five Japanese families owned the land in Brazil. They started the cultivation of 
 cotton. 
1910  Japan annexed Korea. The rush of Japanese migration to Korea started. 
1914  The number of Japanese immigrants to Brazil exceeded ten thousands. 
  The state government of São Paulo announced termination of immigration 
  contract with Japanese migration companies. 
  The World War I broke out. 
  The direct immigration from Japan to Argentina began. 
1915  Japanese colony plantations were opened, the most famous being “Hirano Colony 
Plantation.” 
  The first Japanese school was opened in São Paulo (Taisho School) 
1916  The first Japanese language newspaper was issued in Brazil. 
1921  The state government of São Paulo announced termination of travel subsidies    to 
 Japanese  immigrants. 
1924  The United States enacted the law which prohibited the new immigration from 
  Japan. As a result, the immigration to Latin America was boosted. 
1925  The Japanese government began travel subsidies to Japanese immigrants to Brazil.   
  It was the start of the government sponsored immigration to Brazil. 
1926  The Japanese governments loaned 850,000 yen, with very low interest rate, to 
  Japanese coffee farmers in Brazil. 
1927  “Overseas Immigration Union Law (Kaigai Iju Kumiai Ho)” was enacted. The 
  purpose of the law was to promote Japanese colony plantations. 
1928  Japanese immigration to Canada was severely restricted by the Canadian 
 government.  49
1929  “The Ministry of Immigration (Takumu sho)” was created, with the mission to 
promote and direct Japanese emigration. 
  The Great Depression. The price of coffee plunged. 
1931  The Manchurian Incident broke out. 
1932  Manchuria became an “independent state.” The flood of Japanese immigration to 
  Manchuria started (until the end of the World War II in 1945) 
  The Japanese government greatly increased travel subsidies to Japanese 
 immigrants  to  Brazil. 
1934  “Two percent clause” was added to the Brazilian Constitution. The clause 
  limited the number of annual inflow of immigrants from each country to two 
  percent of total immigration from each country in the last 50 years. This 
  resulted in a severe reduction of Japanese immigration to Brazil. 
1936  “The 2.26 Incident” occurred in Japan. (About 1400 military personnel attempted 
coup d’etat on February 26. Many politicians, including the Minister of Finance, 
were assassinated. Although the coup attempt failed, the military authorities took 
control of the Japanese government since then. 
  Cotton plantations managed by Japanese immigrants increased substantially. 
1937  Japanese language education for students under 14 years old was prohibited in 
 Brazil. 
1938  The Brazilian new immigration law was enacted, which severely restricted 
  Japanese immigrants’ rights. 
  Japanese (also German and Italian) language schools were forced to close in Brazil. 
  Japanese short-wave radio broadcast to overseas began. 
1939  Many Japanese immigrants returned to Japan. 
  The World War II broke out. 
1941  Japanese language newspapers were prohibited in Brazil. 
  The Pacific War (Japan-U.S. War) broke out. 
1942  Brazil cut diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy and Japan. 
  Various oppression measures were imposed on Japanese immigrants in Brazil. 
1945  Brazil declared war to Japan (in June) 
  Atomic bombs were dropped to Hiroshima and Nagasaki (in August) 
  Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces (in August) 
1946  Terrorist attacks by “Kachi-Gumi (non-believer of Japanese defeat)” on 
  “Make-Gumi (believer of Japanese defeat) increased.   
1947  “Return home scam” victims increased among Japanese immigrants in Brazil. 
1950  About 50 members of the right-wing fraud syndicate “Kokumin Zenei Tai 
  (National Vangurd)” were arrested in São Paulo. 
1951  The first Japanese ship (Kobe-Maru) after the W.W.II arrived in the port of Santos. 
1951  Mr. Tamaru became the first Nikkeijin parliament member of the State of São Paulo. 
1952  The Brazilian government approved resumption of Japanese immigration. 
1953  The first Japanese immigrants after the WWII arrived in Santos. 
1955  The Emigration Department was established in the Japanese Ministry of 
  Foreign Affairs. The mission of the department was to promote Japanese 
 emigration  to  the  Americas. 
1956  The first group of Japanese immigrants arrived in Dominican Republic.  50
1957  The foreign direct investment of the Japanese firms to Brazil increased. 
1959  Japanese Prime Minister Kishi visited Brazil and Argentina. 
1961  Prime Minister Ikeda in Japan announced the “income doubling plan”, which 
  initiated miraculous economic growth in Japan. 
1961  Pan-American Airlines began scheduled service between Japan and Brazil, which 
  connected the two countries in 40 hours. 
  About 600 Japanese immigrants to Dominican Republic returned home, and 
 reported  their  terrible  immigration experiences. 
1960s  Emigration boom subsided in Japan due to the Japanese economic success. 
1988 Return  migration  of  Nikkeijin workers increased. 
1990  The Japanese immigration law was revised, allowing the second and third 
  generations of the Japanese emigrants to come and work in Japan. 
1990s The  number  of  Nikkeijin workers in Japan dramatically increased. 
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APPENDIX II: Methodology of the Surveys Cited in the Paper 
 
In section IV of the paper, I quoted three surveys on remittances by Nikkeijin. Brief summary 
of methodology of the three surveys are as follows:   
 
1. 1993 survey by Japan Institute of Labor 
(1) Sample: Nikkeijin living in Brazil 
(2) Number of questionnaires distributed: 500 
(3) Number of interviews: 376 (of which 202 (53.7%) had an experience of working in Japan) 
(4) Date of interviews: September 1993 
 
2. 1998 Survey by Japan Institute of Labor 
(1) Sample: Nikkeijin living in Brazil 
(2) Number of questionnaires distributed: 300 
(3) Number of interviews: 205 (of which 106 (51.7%) had an experience of working in Japan) 
(4) Date of interviews: September 1998 
 
3. 2005 Survey commissioned by the Inter-American Bank 
(1) Sample: Latin American immigrant adults living in Japan 
(2) Number of Interview: 1,070 interviews 
(3) Language of Interviews: Portuguese, Spanish and Japanese 
(4) Date of interviews: February 2005 